This chapter examines the intellectual phenomenon of theoretical aversion in legal scholarship, as it specifically manifests in environmental law. It first demonstrates how a proposed turn to methodology seeks to constrain theory within the strict contours of an epistemology that serves to support the scientific aspirations of legal scholarship. This notion of theory as epistemology is in turn linked to environmental law's overwhelming concern with controlling the relation between scholarship and action for the purpose of constituting itself as valid expert authority in the context of contemporary environmental discursive practices. Building on the critique of this view of theory as a pure research design element, the chapter articulates a different perspective, recovered from theoretical excess and inspired by the life and work of Michel Foucault, which merges the distinction between scholarship and action via the -correct -use of the metaphor of the 'tool box', often mishandled in Foucaultian scholarship. By reorienting this metaphor, the chapter argues that the contestation over the precise role of theory within environmental law relates to the historical evolution of the current role of the legal researcher who is expected to function solely as an expert on environmental change. The task of critical environmental law thus becomes to resist the assigned role within the established regime of environmental truth and to make novel and expansive contributions of the 'tool box' of environmental thought and practice.
REPULSION
It is revealing for the future directions of legal scholarship that a prominent handbook on legal research methodologies, written for an audience of aspiring PhD scholars and early career academics, diagnoses and partly seeks to 'dispel this fear or unease with "theory"'. 2 The source of these emotions is never fully explained, but there is a sense that being called a theorist should be unwelcome; 3 an intimation that 'particularly what some call "capital T" theory', 4 the 'arcane preserve of a small group of self-identified… Theorists', 5 is used 'to mystify and oversell mediocre ideas, or simply to sound clever'. 6 It seems that a mysterious malaise lingers in the halls of the late modern law school, transmitted through dangerous intellectual contact.
Symptoms may include mystification, abstraction and generalisation. Be careful and 1 Michel Foucault, 'Truth and Power' in Colin Gordon (ed) , Power and Knowledge: Selected writing and Interviews 1972 -1977 (Pantheon Books 1980 , 109
2 Robert Cryer and others, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Hart Publishing 2011), 5 3 'We rejected the use of the word 'theory' alone because in our experience many legal scholars… are uncomfortable with expressly identifying themselves as theorists', at ibid, 5. 4 Ibid, 1
5 Ibid, 1 6 Ibid, 2
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profession, 12 and in particular the responsibility and role of legal academics within the university, as well as more broadly in society.
Critical legal studies went 'bust' in the 1990s in North American academia, 13 and only re-emerged as a politically restrained 'law and humanities' school. 14 
6 How then can the aspiring young researchers in the field of environmental law, which are still drawn to such unsettling meditations and critiques stay on 'the straight and narrow', and protect themselves from the spread of this seeming malaise? As the current orthodoxy will have it, there is a type of 'safe' theorywithout the capital T -that can lead to valid erudition, as opposed to self-indulgent oblivion. Under this safe schema, arcane ostentation is to be dropped; they can understand theory simply as a foundational design element in the process of conceiving legal research projects, as another term for methodology. They then will be able to be guided by the understanding that 'every legal research project begins from a theoretical basis or bases, whether these are articulated or not', 16 without fearing that their scholarship would be affected by the malaise of capital-T theory.
Choosing this 'theoretical basis' will in turn determine the different conceptions and meanings attached to law both as an ideal and as practice, the types of questions deemed worthy of being posed and problems deemed worthy of being tackled, as well as the types of acceptable sources, materials and methods to be deployed. In short, what will protect the legal scholar is the equation of theory with making choices from a shopping list of available theoretical bases and methodological frameworks, with a process of reflective research design that safely structures the possible fields of enquiry for the legal scholar.
This turn towards methodology, in its almost self-evident common sense character, its quasi-religious element of renouncing bad influences and its careerist adoption of best research practice, is further analysed in the next section. The particular focus of analysis then shifts to the operation of this turn in environmental 16 Cryer and others, 5
7 law, where legal scholarship's fear of theory becomes intertwined with ecology's suspicion against theorising in the face of environmental catastrophe. In the fourth section of this chapter, charting the mutual reinforcement between the two types of aversion ultimately exposes that the repulsion is driven by the field's very own particular admiration for the scientific model of enquiry and the concomitant authoritative access to political truth it provides in contemporary society.
By referring to the work of Michel Foucault, regarded as one of most dangerous influences leading legal researchers down the path of critical legal theory, the chapter further demonstrates that the rejection of critical legal theory also constitutes a rejection of a particular configuration of the relation between scholarship and action; of a certain political role of the legal researcher within the politics of change. However, the section also renders clear some of critical scholarship's own fetishes and complicity in its own downfall, focusing on the misappropriations of the concept of the Foucaultian 'toolbox'.
Finally, based on the Foucaultian concepts of the regime of truth and historical discontinuity, the chapter examines certain contradictions in the selfperceived responsibility of environmental law scholarship that the conception of theory as methodology is attempting to hide. From this analysis, the chapter concludes that the primary task for the environmental law researcher that wants to practically (re)navigate the relationship between scholarship and action, without succumbing to the fear of theory, is a difficult engagement with the idea of change.
PURITY: THEORY QUA EPISTEMOLOGY
In an interconnected globalised world in a continuing state of environmental crisis and with ever decreasing margins for taking action to prevent catastrophe, consequence, any discussion of theoretical bases of legal research is not distinguishable from the discussion of its epistemological bases.
Such an understanding of legal epistemology is manifested -and the notion of theory qua epistemology is also in turn confirmed -in the conception of theory as 'theoretical framework' that supports the production of mature legal scholarship. The framework constitutes the methodological and conceptual scaffolding that will securely underpin the construction of a proper legal enquiry; pruning obstacles and removing dangers to its scientific standing, and preparing it for its entry into the separate, applied phase. Theory qua epistemology thus becomes the subservient under-labourer (as opposed to the subversive other) of legal scholarship, restricted and palatable, domesticated in a 'structural', albeit auxiliary, role. Theory is the assistant scaffold, to be removed once the actual building itself (the legal enquiry) is
completed.
Yet this conception appears to underplay the possibility that scholarship in the humanities broadly conceived -by its very nature -also requires theoretical clarity as to the social, cultural, ethical and other contexts -and effects -of the idea, phenomenon or problem being studied actually constitutes. This simple possibility is behind the long-standing concern of critical theory with the self-evidences and acquiesces on which our systems of thought rely. to consciously address and reflect on the methodological challenges that seemingly prevent the coherent maturation of the scholarly field.
Any environmental law scholar that has faced awkward questions about (not) saving the planet from friends and family at various social gatherings can appreciate this notion of a pure academic discipline kept distinct from the applied political project of achieving environmental protection through the force of law. Quite simply, it may be a relief to accept that environmental law scholarship cannot always be the equivalent of environmental law. Such an absolution of responsibility of course serves as an enticing lure pulling towards a 'healthy' epistemology and away from the tortuous malaise of theory. The question then becomes, is the lure also a siren call?
The intellectual value of attaining some type of clarity between scholarship and action on the environment is accepted in many scholarly quarters, including by theoretical scholarship that has been called critical environmental law. 29 Such a broad acceptance can give the impression that the path by which such clarity is to be achieved is straightforward or that a clear division between scholarship and action is desirable by all, both 'sensible' legal researchers and 'arcane' critical theorists. But the path is actually determined by the proximity to the scientific model of enquiry.
The very mimicry of a binary division between basic 'scholarship' and applied 'action' on the basis of an epistemological conception of theory as theory of knowledge only serves a project of continuing rapprochement between the legal method and scientific method.
29 See Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 3-4 on how the failure to theorise the connection between law and ecology in terms of anything other than a blueprint for action fails to create the necessary distance from the 'processes and goals of environmental law'. Yet we can safely presume that economic theory is not part of the arsenal of 'capital-T' Theory that constitutes a malaise for legal scholarship. In fact, the enshrinement of both scientific and economic explanation as the primary source of authority and legitimacy in the field is already accepted.
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For the critical environmental lawyer therefore, submitting to the lure of separating scholarship and action is, in fact, a siren call. At best, it leads to cooptation and the excising of the inappropriate kinds of theory; at worst, it marks the scholar with the yellow star of arcane theory. Foucault, 1954 -1984 : Vol 3 (New Press 2000 , 237. French philosophers think for the sake of acting, of transforming a society they find intolerable'. 49 From the above, the tool box emerges at a connecting node between scholarship and action (or in Foucaultian vocabulary, between thought and practice), the latter understood as a type of emancipatory politics of change that theory serves to formulate. It is as a collection of instruments developed by the researcher to be used by the practitioner, the activist, the government etc. By extension, the goal of the scholar is to keep this toolbox stocked with new and useful instruments; and not to use it a shortcut for the simplification of his own work; in other words, not to use it as a type of theoretical framework.
The Intellectual and the Expert
In expanding this analysis of possible configurations of theory and practice, Turning back to environmental scholarship in general, and its descent from the modern environmental movement, it is instructive to remember that it has always been a field constructed by the discourse of the expert, rather than the universal intellectual. The early figures and leaders, such as Rachel Carson or Barry 58 'A secondary matter' according to Foucault, in ibid, 131. Commoner, of the movement were concerned scientists; they followed in the footsteps of Oppenheimer. This should not constitute a source of quixotic refusals by critical environmental law or febrile acquiesces by legal researchers anxious to avoid being affected by the malaise of theory. refers to the political operation of a regime of truth, meaning the mechanisms by which true and false discourses are distinguished and operate as such, the methods by which truth is acquired, and indeed the status and credentials required for those experts that are identified as speaking the truth, 60 which is highly relevant to this chapter's discussion of the role of environmental law scholarship. It is these politics of truth that e.g. prioritise natural sciences and economics over theory as discourses capable of addressing environmental problems, as long as the truths of science and economics can be incorporated into mature legal scholarship using a well thoughtout method.
The Regime of Truth
Consequently, the expert, in addition to his place as a researcher within the university or other institutions, also occupies a position within this broader regime of truth that exists in society. The battle for truth exists as a political conflict 'around truth', and scientific truth does not equate political truth. This is not a conflict over the scientific truths to be 'proven' e.g. the reality of climate change, biodiversity loss or pollution, but over the political and economic realisation of such truths that have attained sufficient status within society's regime of truth. 61 In this way, the line that divides scientific and political truth, and consequently scholarship and action, is purposefully blurred in this Foucaultian schema, as the researcher continues to navigate and overcome the binary relation between the two. It is certain however that if the expert is interested is fermenting any type of change, as most outspoken interventions by environmental scholars, legal or otherwise, aspire to, then it is no use harking back to the retro fashion of the universal intellectual speaking truth against power. The intervention instead needs to address and challenge the politics of the regimes of truth. 60 Ibid 61 Foucault, 'Truth and Power', 132 To prepare for such an intervention, the role of the researcher within the regime of truth is to be apprehended and analysed historically. here that this includes the order that exists between scholarship and action.
Therefore, it is through history that the limits of both thought and practice are to be located by the scholar seeking to furnish new forms of action.
Following the above Foucaultian insights, the next section begins the necessary historical analysis regarding the descent of the present relation between environmental law scholarship and action, focusing on its currently favourable disposition towards the epistemological turn. Based on these historical findings, the final section aims to provide some helpful points of departure to environmental law researchers, who are entering the field during a period of generalised, and multi-62 Which also accord with the fact that 'much' of the critical legal writing 'has been historical', see level, aversion to theory, but who also sense theory as something more than a methodological choice related to early stages of research design.
ANAMNESIS: ON THE HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 'LAW AND ENVIRONMENT' STUDIES
If the field of enquiry is best identified in the broadest terms as 'law and environment studies', as esteemed scholars such as Patricia Birnie, Richard
Macrory, Alan Boyle and others have frequently veered towards, then it would follow logically that the overarching object of analysis would be the relation itself between law and nature, following the intellectual tradition of 'law and…' studies. Instead, the way the methodological turn transitions into the defence of the authority of the legal researcher as another type of environmental expert makes it apparent that the principal object of study is rather thought to be the type and level of applied assistance that law should render to the task of addressing serious contemporary environmental challenges; from the Foucaultian perspective identified above, the goal may be understood as making a contribution to the toolbox of environmentalism.
Those two aims are connected, but they are not identical. Scholars increasingly do cast themselves into the role of the 'problem-solving doctors ', 65 turning law into 'a plug and play instrument that is expected to deliver certain results', 66 abandoning the notion of studying law and nature or the environment altogether. But the very ambivalence of rejecting this direction in the name of pure scholarship, while also relying on it for professional recognition as an expert who is to be listened can be disorienting, and explains to an extent the fraught relationship between environmental law scholarship and environmental politics. At the core of this relationship is the perception of change. Thus, a contradiction often alluded to can now finally emerge: Is environmental law the study of change or the study of how to change? And which of the two pathways is preferable for the aspiring researcher?
The engagement with such questions brings the analysis back to the general aversion towards theory in the legal field charted in the beginning of this chapter. In addressing these questions, environmental lawyers run into the perceived dangers of political bias or irrelevancy, 'single-minded pursuit' or 'dilettantism'. These are very similar to some of the perceived dangers of critical theory associated with the spectre of the universal intellectual; dangers that the methodological/epistemological turn seeks to mitigate. First, the impartial and scientific nature of environmental law scholarship is in constant danger of being co-opted by various political biases and actions, against which the mature environmental law scholar must immunise, in the tradition of the best natural scientists. As regards the danger of irrelevance, this is mitigated by mimicking the fragmented structure of issue-specific environmental regulatory regimes. Such observations unearth disjunctions swiftly (re)arranged into evolutionary historical schemas of environmental law. The latter often take the standard legal historiographical form of teleological evolution from classical, to modern and contemporary, 'post-modern' eras.
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These histories of the progress of environmental law subsume and conflate the legal scholarship aspect, partially confirming the argument of proponents of the methodological turn in environmental law about the need for separation. Alternatively, when these events remain unarranged and retain the character of personal anecdotes or recollections, as in the cases of some of the works cited above, then they usually convey a sense of maturation and achievement felt by the proud members of an academic discipline that went from non-existence to maturity in a relatively short time span of a few decades.
From a Foucaultian perspective, the tendency to structure events into a linear, smooth and 'continuist' histories of maturity and progress in order to derive historical explanations should be resisted, because such structures are post-facto There is of course far more to be analysed regarding the historical descent of this certain functionalism -viewed as the transformation of an ethical and political commitment to ecology into a commitment to goal-orientated scholarship -in this particular regime of truth. But this short snapshot -this short deployment of the political instrument of history writing -begins to illustrate the ease by which the regime's operation can be discerned historically if its discontinuity is left 'unsmoothened'. Barely glancing at a historical reversal, we can already find traces of the current relationship between scholarship and action in environmental law as not something that has inevitably or consciously evolved over time to its present state, but something that contains the bitterness 81 and struggle of the early years of academic environmental lawyers. The pattern can always fall into place in a different way; or it can be encouraged to do so by legal scholarship that refuses to play the role of the restricted technical expert of the last instance.
ACCEPTANCE
The preceding analysis may appear counter-intuitive or even contrarian to some readers. On the one hand, the methodological turn is critiqued as masked subservience to the scientific model and aversion to theory is dismissed as careerist co-optation, driven by the self-serving motivation to maintain the relevance of environmental law as field of expertise in our contemporary world. On the other 80 Macrory, 252
81 Notice e.g. Richard Lazarus direct critique of Harvard Law School's treatment of the field of environmental law. See n. 71 above.
hand, theoretical scholarship is also indeed critiqued as a malaise identified by its flirtation with mystification and obscurantism; to add insult to injury, this critique is based on the work of Michel Foucault, frequently considered a source of much 'theory' of variable levels of quality.
The intention is twofold: to recover the Foucaultian perspective from some overzealous bundling together with critical legal theory, and to reconstruct its operation, as it relates to environmental law. It is not to advocate apathetic cynicism by suggesting that every avenue available to the inquisitive legal researcher is either blocked or pre-determined. It is not to reinforce the facile and binary fatalism of having to choose between adopting a careerist attitude and indulging a nostalgic fantasy. Quite simply, the erection of the strawman of the arcane critical theorist should not be met by the erection of the equivalent strawman of the co-opted expert.
Beyond the counter-sneering, from both quarters, at irrelevancy or compromise, beyond the extremes of the scholar who is only validated when his work is quoted by a judge and the scholar who only feels sage when hiding behind the crutch of language, lies the acceptance of a difficult role -and responsibility -for environmental law to meaningfully contribute to the 'tool box' of environmental thought in the context of a scholarship that goes beyond legislative drafting, but equally does not lose all its tethers to the legal field.
The lure of establishing a pure demarcation between 'scholarly' and applied environmental problems is attractive to all schools of legal thought on the environment. But it remains a lure. The multiple social and political functions of the very idea of purity are already known to anthropology. 82 The links between notions of maturity in legal scholarship and methodological reflection, or between notions of malaise and critical legal theory, serve to control the relationship between scholarship and action. In the process, they detract from the task of addressing the larger challenge: environmental law exists to both study and manufacture change.
The acceptance of the role of the expert requires demanding and constant reflection, responsibly navigating between scientific and political truth, on the multitudinous idea of change.
The brief overview of the historical reversal between scholarship and action included in this chapter easily rendered visible this centrality, in the motivations for the emergence of the field itself. More detailed historical studies will of course be capable of unearthing much more of the field's evolution and the operation of its regime of truth. But for now, we can posit that environmental law is a form of thought that does not fit neatly into the boxes of scholarship and action, theory and practice and so on. Whenever one of those boxes is isolated, irrespective whether it is by a policy expert, a doctrinal scholar, a sociolegal empiricist or an arcane critical theorist, a dangerous path is forged, eliding the difficult question of finding the right balance between studying and promoting change.
Despite the best efforts at epistemological purity by way of method and theory, environmental law is still a study of change inveigled with the study of how to change; a circle that cannot be completed, an irreconcilable catch-22 disrupting the core of all these disciplinary labels and brand names that 21 st century academics create for their little enterprising projects. Foucault was both a theorist and an expert in a way that critiqued the standard associations borne out of both labels.
Transcending such labels should equally constitute the primary task of Foucaultinspired legal scholarship on the environment. (Edward Elgar 2016) 
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